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On Oct. 17, Brazil's electoral council (Tribunal Superior Electoral, TSE) released the final tally of
the Oct. 3 presidential elections, which confirmed the first-round victory of Fernando Henrique
Cardoso. Although the president- elect will take office on Jan. 1, he is already setting in motion the
programs of his administration. To carry out his plans, however, Cardoso will have to form alliances
with the opposition, especially opponent Luis Inacio Lula da Silva's Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT),
since the PT will be a major player in Congress during the Cardoso administration.
The official count released Oct. 17 by the TSE gave the following results, in percentage of valid votes:
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) - 54.3% Luis Inacio Lula da Silva (PT) - 27.0% Eneas Carneiro
(Prona) - 7.4% Orestes Quercia (PMDB) - 4.4% Leonel Brizola (PDT) - 3.2% Esperidiao Amin (PPR) 2.7% Carlos Gomes (PRN) - 0.6% Almirante Fortuna (PSC) - 0.4% In examining the results, political
analysts were alarmed at the high absenteeism and the number of null and blank ballots.
Voting is mandatory in Brazil and failure to comply carries stiff fines and other penalties.
Nevertheless, overall absenteeism those who either boycotted the polls or simply failed to cast
ballots once they arrived reached 17% of all registered voters, three times greater than in the 1989
general elections. In fact, in the ballot for congressional seats which was included parallel to, but
separate from, the presidential ballot on Oct. 3 more than 50% of registered voters simply abstained
from casting ballots. Moreover, when the number of voters who completely boycotted the polls or
failed to cast ballots are combined with those who cast null or blank ballots, total abstention rose to
one-third of the registered voters in the presidential balloting, and to two-thirds in the congressional
ballot.
Analysts attribute this high incidence of absenteeism and invalid votes to several factors, including
a protest against compulsory voting. In addition, they point out the complexity of the voting process,
which involved two ballots. One ballot included candidates for president, governor, and two senate
seats. The other ballot contained candidates for federal and state deputies. According to the TSE,
more than one-third of Brazilian voters are illiterate, which makes using the two- ballot system
particularly difficult. Although in most states the elections went relatively smoothly, in Rio de
Janeiro seven parties demanded a recount in the election of national and state deputies after the
Regional Electoral Tribunal (TRE) discovered evidence that widespread ballot tampering had
occurred during the count.
On Oct. 19, in an unprecedented move, the TRE ordered a new election for deputies to be held in
Rio on Nov. 15, coinciding with the second round of the gubernatorial election. "Certainly there
will be a recount," said TRE spokesperson Gelcio Cunha. "It was not such a surprise that there was
fraud because it has happened in previous elections it was the scale of it this time that no one was
prepared for." Meanwhile, even before the official results of the presidential contest were released,
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the president-elect was under considerable pressure from the three parties in his electoral coalition,
each of which are lobbying for Cardoso to appoint their members to cabinet posts. Among those
heavily pressuring Cardoso is the powerful former governor of Bahia, Antonio Carlos Magalhaes,
of the Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL). The PFL is the party of Cardoso's vice president Marco
Maciel. According to insiders, Magalhaes has said he expects to have a say in naming at least three
ministers. Also pressuring Cardoso is one of his major campaign financiers, Jose Eduardo Vieira,
senator from Parana state and owner of the third largest private bank in the country. Vieira wants
Cardoso to name someone from Parana as minister of agriculture.
"We are not thinking about distributing positions, we are concerned about establishing policies,"
Cardoso said in an indirect message to those pressuring him for appointments. "The country is
not interested in knowing how many ministries are in the control of this or that party, the country
wants the ministries to function. And to make them function harmoniously and efficiently is the job
of the president." In outlining the plans for his administration, Cardoso stressed that the health,
education, and agriculture ministries will be key during his presidency. Among his major concerns
is the need to address the nation's staggering poverty rate. His advisors are already preparing a
public works and anti-poverty program patterned after the Solidaridad project implemented by
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico. The program is expected to provide assistance to
seven million low-income families in Brazil. Cardoso's electoral victory was closely tied to the
success of the economic stabilization plan, termed the Plan Real, that he designed as minister of
finance . His greatest challenge as president will be to keep the Plan Real on course and avoid a
return to the hyperinflation that plagued the country during the last several years.
To assure the continued success of the Plan Real, Cardoso and his advisors intend to steer several
constitutional amendments through Congress before the Jan. 1 change of administration. According
to his transition team, these changes will also modernize the political system, revitalize the state's
social action programs, and also overhaul and simplify the tax structure. Under the Brazilian
Constitution, constitutional change requires the consent of three-fifths of the Congress. Thus, to
accomplish his legislative goals, Cardoso will need the cooperation of other parties, including the
PT. Although Cardoso has expressed a desire to cooperate with the PT, any move in that direction
angers Cardoso's conservative allies, say analysts. However, Cardoso and Lula were often involved
in the same struggles during the years Brazil was under military dictatorship (1964-85) and the PSDB
often collaborated with the PT on specific issues when civilian rule returned. Those experiences
could pave the way for a closer relationship between Lula and the new president, and bring some
concessions from the PT.
Although the PT lost the presidency, it greatly enhanced its position in Congress, winning sixty seats
in the 513-member lower house, and five of the senate's 81 seats. Before the elections the PT had
36 seats in the lower house and one in the senate. These gains will place the PT in a good position
to negotiate with the Cardoso administration. Meanwhile, the PT has been using the post-election
period to assess its future role in Brazilian politics. PT leaders say that in planning medium- to
long-term strategy in the wake of Lula's defeat, the PT will undoubtedly move toward the political
center. The "radicals" within the party, including party president Rui Falcao and vice president Luiz
Eduardo Greenhalgh, will most likely be further marginalized, since their hard-line stance is blamed
in part for Lula's defeat. On the other hand, moderates such as the well-respected deputy from Sao
Paulo, Jose Genoino, is expected to assume a more prominent role in the party.
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 3

LADB Article Id: 56442
ISSN: 1060-4189

Post-election analysis by party leaders also attribute Lula's defeat to the party's failure to make
alliances during the campaign, and the strategy of attacking Cardoso's Plan Real. Those attacks
backfired as the improved economic indicators held going into the elections, along with the
Cardoso's popularity. Latin American analysts also point out that the PT's loss of the Brazilian
presidency also means the loss of the Latin American left's best hope in recent years to offer an
alternative to the neoliberal economic policies dominating the region. The PT is one of the most
powerful socialist parties in Latin America.

-- End --
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